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FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL
INTEGRATION: 1954-1978.* BY J. Harvie Wilkinson III. New York:
Oxford University Press. 1979. Pp. viii, 368. $17.95.

"Brown may be the most important political, social, and legal
event in America's twentieth-century history. Its greatness lay in the
enormity of injustice it condemned, in the entrenched sentiment it
challenged, in the immensity of law it both created and overthrew''
(p. 6). From Brown to Bakke narrates the nation's uneven acceptance and the Supreme Court's unsure implementation of Brown v.
Board ofEducation. 1 The narrative's plot: the Supreme Court's attempt to integrate education, beginning with Brown and cµlminating, twenty-two years later, in Regents of the University of Cal!fornia
v. Bakke.2 Its characters: the nation's highest court, students black
and white, local school boards, NAACP attorneys, well-meaning social scientists, much-harried federal district court judges, and, of
course, the forces of evil, personified in figures like former Arkansas
Governor Orval Faubus. Its theme: like many tales of Milton and
Blake, this book studies the loss of innocence.
The Supreme Court's innocence was manifested in the
unanimous Brown opinion, where integration and racial equality
seemed so eminently attainable, a simple matter of judicial decree
and reliance on the children (" 'I have seen them do it,' Thurgood
Marshall told the Court in Brown. 'They play in the streets together,
they play on their farms together, they go down the road together,
they separate to go to school, they come out of school and play ball
together'" (p. 41)). That innocence was but a memory by the time of
the "brokered judgment" (p. 298) in Bakke, where the Justices struggled in several opinions to maintain some semblance of support for
affirmative action, seemingly the last, best hope of blacks seeking
educational and social parity in the Land of Promise.
J. Harvie Wilkinson attributes this loss of innocence, this change
in spirit from Brown to Bakke, to two forces. In grand fictional
form, one force was internal, personal to the Court, and thus in some
sense less excusable. The other was impersonal, finding its expression in two disheartening racial clashes generated by the inner logic
of the Court's sweeping attempt to integrate education.
The Supreme Court's personal failing, Wilkinson believes, was in
not standing behind the "all deliberate speed" language of Brown
• This book review was prepared by an Editor of the Michigan Law Review.-Ed.
I. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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II. 3 He argues forcefully, if ultimately unpersuasively,4 that Brown
II was itself correct. In his view, gradualism - "a course of steadily
mounting federal pressure, which allowed the South its :filibusters
and fulminations, but all the while forced private reckonings that
Southerners were, after all, a part of the nation" (p. 68) - was the
proper course. But from 1955, the year of Brown II, until the
landmark Green 5 decision in 1968, the Supreme Court virtually
abandoned the field of school desegregation it had so promisingly
staked out. Implementation was left to the forty-eight federal district
judges in the southern states and, to a lesser degree, to,the Fourth
and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Supreme Court's failure to
supervise this implementation contributed largely to the uneven and
uninspired progress of integration.
Wilkinson describes the Court's unsure implementation of Brown
- rather than demanding substantial integration, "it pleaded, mediated, mollified, or even withdrew" (p. 310) - but he fails to explain
it. He emphasizes that the Supreme Court is a pragmatic institution,
both reflective of and responsive to the political environment in
which it operates, and he notes that "[i]n almost all the landmark
school cases, white racial sensibilities weighed heavily" (p. 310). But
he never clearly explains why this pragmatic institution cared so
much about white racial sensibilities.
Perhaps the Justices feared that a "desegregation now" order
would provoke outbreaks of violence that would threaten life and
property. Perhaps they feared that such an order would leave black
children with a pyrrhic victory - desegregated education that was
valueless in the face of white hostility. Or perhaps they were concerned that outright defiance would reveal the Court's powerlessness
to enforce its own judgment.
Whatever the reason for the Court's failure, it did not stay above
the fray forever. In 1968, in Green v. County School Board, it announced that its attempt to integrate education would be "deliberate" no longer. Yet Wilkinson contends that this victory over the
internal force was not adequate to prevent the loss of innocence.
The promises made in Brown could not be ful:filled by judicial fiat;
the logic of the Brown decision itself generated clashes that forced
the Court to confront the complexity of America's racial problem.
Brown stood for several propositions. On the one hand, its
message was that minorities have a right to equal educational opportunity, and segregated classrooms and instruction do not provide
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
4. Cf. Black, The U'!finished Business ofthe Warren Court, 46 WASH, L. REV. 3, 22 (1970)
(arguing that Brown II undermined respect for fundamental law by asking blacks to postpone
enjoyment of a right the Supreme Court had just declared was constitutionally theirs).
5. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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that equal educational opportunity. But America's neighborhoods
- particularly in the urban North and West - were as segregated as
its schools. Practically speaking, if Brown required integration, it
also required busing. But Brown also stood for the primacy and centrality of education in American life, and for many, particularly middle- and lower-class urban whites, education meant safe, secure
neighborhood schools. These ideals inevitably clashed and rekindled the fears and hatred that Brown had hoped to still. In the 1974
Detroit busing case6 - the first school case lost by black plaintiffs in
the Brown era7 -the Supreme Court resolved the clash in favor of
the neighborhood. For Wilkinson, the decision was a "great gamble
. . . that black progress would continue in the absence of an activist
judiciary" (p. 242). It was also a sign that the loss of innocence
would not be pretty.
Brown stood for still another idea - the color-blind Constitution. 8 In its purest form, such an ideal is irreconcilable with affirmative action programs that seek to remedy the educational
disadvantages of past prejudice by treating minorities preferentially.
The clash between the ideal of color-blindness and the ideal of equal
educational opportunity also found its way to the Supreme Court,
first in .DeFunis and finally in Bakke.
With Bakke, the Court's loss of innocence was complete. The
long moralistic voyage begun with "optimism and confidence" had
reached a stage of "confusion and doubt" (p. 308). WilkiLson's discussion of the Bakke decision is slightly less insightful than his analysis of the busing decisions, in part, perhaps, because it was written
so soon after the event. But while he hedges in expressing his personal opinion on busing, Wilkinson's judgment on Bakke shines
through clearly:
Perhaps there has never been a case before the Supreme Court with
opposing arguments of more equal legitimacy. The Court's own task
in Bakke was to avoid a conclusive outcome. . . .
The Court did just that. If Brown was a great moral blow, Bakke
was a brokered judgment. The Supreme Court offered "a Solomonic
compromise," in which "the nine justices spoke in many voices, a chorus of competing viewpoints adding up to a well-modulated counterpoint". [P. 298.]

From Brown to Bakke is elegant and engrossing. It loses none of
its penetration for being written in clear and simple prose, and it
loses none of its winsomeness for including a heavy dose of professorial legal analysis. One of the most engaging aspects of the narrative
6. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
7. There followed a rash of others. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S.
406 (1977); Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
8. The phrase was coined by the elder Justice Harlan in lone dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
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is the liberal sprinkling of anecdotes. For example, Wilkinson describes Virginia Governor Linwood Holton's politically courageous
decision in 1973 to send his children to black-majority public schools
in Richmond in hopes of lessening resistance to desegregation orders
in that race-tom city. We also learn that Marco DeFunis, two short
years after escaping the notoriety that would forever belong to Allan
Bakke,9 filed an amicus brief on Bakke's behalf for the Young Americans .for Freedom.
Perhaps, as Professor David Chambers suggested in an earlier
review, Mr. Wilkinson writes "generally with the detachment of a
person telling someone else's tale," 10 and perhaps the book suffers as
a result; but I do not think so. For while its narrator may be detached, his story is ours. As the black minority shared the humiliation, so must the white majority share the shame. Together we must
face an uncertain future:
From Brown to Bakke has been a maturing journey also. Findings in
the education cases laid bare the depth of American prejudice and
made clear the true dimensions of our difficulties. We now seem to be
many sad and wise days away from those happy forecasts of playground bliss. What we better understand is our own lack of understanding. School integration has taught us at home what Vietnam did
abroad: how much eludes the American capacity to reshape. [P. 308.]
9. DeFunis was, in 1971, in a position similar to that of Allan Bakke. However, he was
admitted to the University of Washington Law School while his appeal from an unfavorable
state supreme court ruling was pending. Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari, it
declared the question before it moot when it became apparent that DeFunis would graduate
regardless of the outcome of the case. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per
curiam).
10. Chambers, Clashes in the Classroom, Wash. Post, July 8, 1979, § E, at 1, col. I.

